DCR ⇒ PKE
Statement
DCR implies CPA-secure PKE: the Paillier cryptosystem has public key with an RSA modulus and of order a nonzero multiple of ( suffices), and encrypts as for ; the scheme is semantically secure iff DCR is hard — Pai99.
Sketch
The reduction sets the challenge ciphertext to for DCR challenge : if is an -th residue this is a correctly distributed encryption of , and if is uniform in the ciphertext is uniform and independent of .
\begin{algorithm}
\algname{Algorithm}
\caption{$\KeyGen(1^\secpar)$}
\begin{algorithmic}
\State sample distinct $\secpar$-bit primes $p, q$; $n \gets pq$; $\varphi \gets (p-1)(q-1)$
\Comment{Equal length gives $\gcd(n, \varphi) = 1$}
\Return $(\sk, \pk) \gets ((n, \varphi), n)$
\end{algorithmic}
\end{algorithm}
\begin{algorithm}
\algname{Algorithm}
\caption{$\Enc(\pk, m)$}
\begin{algorithmic}
\State $r \getsr \ZZ_n^*$
\Comment{$m \in \ZZ_n$; $g = 1+n$ has order $n$ in $\ZZ_{n^2}^*$}
\Return $c \gets (1+n)^m \cdot r^n \bmod n^2$
\end{algorithmic}
\end{algorithm}
\begin{algorithm}
\algname{Algorithm}
\caption{$\Dec(\sk, c)$}
\begin{algorithmic}
\State $u \gets c^{\varphi} \bmod n^2$
\Return $m \gets \frac{u - 1}{n} \cdot \varphi^{-1} \bmod n$
\Comment{$u = 1 + m \varphi n \bmod n^2$}
\end{algorithmic}
\end{algorithm}
Notes
- The simplification and the generalisation to modulus are from DJ01.
- Efficiency: a ciphertext is one element of , twice the length of a plaintext in . With , , so encryption costs one exponentiation and decryption one exponentiation by — standard. Working modulo with plaintexts in lowers the expansion to — DJ01.